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Abstract  11 
Language does not fossilize but this doesn’t mean that language’s evolutionary timeline is lost 12 
forever. Great apes provide a window back in time on our last pre-linguistic ancestor’s 13 
communication and cognition. Phylogeny and cladistics implicitly conjure Pan (chimpanzees, 14 
bonobos) as a superior (often the only) model for language evolution compared with earlier 15 
diverging lineages, Gorilla and Pongo (orangutans). Here, in reviewing the literature, we show that 16 
Pan do not surpass other great apes along genetic, cognitive, ecologic or vocal traits that were 17 
putatively paramount for language onset and evolution. Instead, we revive the idea that only by 18 
abandoning single-species models and learning about the variation between great apes may we 19 
have a chance to retrieve lost fragments of the evolutionary timeline of language. 20 
 21 
 22 
1. Introduction: Background and Objective 23 
Three decades ago, scholars at the forefront of the study of human behavioural evolution 24 
forewarned us of the dangers and pitfalls of single-species models [1] – the practice of electing one 25 
particular species, often motivated by circumstantial, proximate or opportune reasons as the 26 
reference point for the theoretical and empirical comparative study of human evolution. In the 27 
1950s and 60s, baboons were the prevalent model species for human behaviour evolution based 28 
on their shared (savannah) ecology and similar primate biology with early hominids [2]. This notion 29 
changed over time [3] and twenty years later, following the development of phylogenetic primate 30 
analyses in the 80s [4], the prevalent model species became chimpanzees. Primatologists at the time 31 
were, however, expeditious, quickly pointing out that living Pan, albeit possessing the highest 32 
phylogenetic relatedness with humans among primates, represented a “radical” and warped model 33 
for human evolution [5]. This lesson is important because living species can never be ancestral of 34 
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extinct ones [5]. Living species have undergone their own evolutionary path since an ancestral node 35 
in a way that obscures the traits that were in fact present in the ancestral node. Today, however, 36 
comparative great ape research across fields seems to have cast off these insights and remains by 37 
and large Pan-centric [6–9].    38 
Fifteen million-years ago, unlike today, the world was inhabited by multiple and 39 
contemporaneous hominid species, of which at least 22 are recognized extinct genera, excluding 40 
the direct ancestors who would become genus Homo [10]. Given how improbable fossilization is, 41 
numbers were beyond doubt much larger than what the fossil record shows. Besides ourselves, 42 
the only surviving traces of this diversity nowadays are the seven (nonhuman) great ape species 43 
alive today, three orangutan, two gorilla, one chimpanzee and one bonobo species, comprising 44 
three genera, Pongo, Gorilla and Pan, respectively. Each extant great ape lineage diverged at different 45 
times from the one that eventually gave raise to Homo (Fig. 1). Pongo was the first lineage to diverge 46 
[11], Gorilla the second [12], Pan the last [13,14]. This is reflected in the level of genetic similarity between 47 
each great ape genus and humans, as well as their taxonomy. All great apes are hominids, including 48 
humans, i.e., members of the Hominidae family. Only humans and Pan (i.e. chimpanzees or 49 
bonobos), however, are recognised as hominins, members of the subfamily Homininae. Given this 50 
phylogenetic proximity and cladistic pedigree, an implicit principle and implication for 51 
comparative research has, thus far, been that Pan represents a better model for the evolutionary 52 
study of human communication and cognition [6–9]. 53 
A quick search in Google Scholar using the term “language evolution” together with the 54 
common name for each of the living great apes yields 5,620 hits for “chimpanzees”, 2,090 for 55 
“bonobos”, 2,200 for “gorillas” and 1,140 for “orangutans” (OR “orang-utans”). Taking these 56 
figures as a (very) rough and preliminary estimate of the current biases in great ape comparative 57 
research in the field of language evolution, ~70% of the literature focuses on Pan (51% 58 
chimpanzees, 19% bonobos), ~20% on Gorilla and 10% on Pongo. Pending a more systematic 59 
assessment of species’ biases, our quick search helps us, at least, get a preliminary glimpse at the 60 
scale of the problem. 61 
Our aim in this paper is to rekindle the view, and its associated cautionary tale, that single-62 
species models are recipes for heuristic confusion and a path towards data deficit when seeking to 63 
understand human evolution and its derived traits. First, we highlight two biases that currently 64 
affect in important ways the perceived importance of Pan, namely with regards to its abundance 65 
and phylogeny. We argue that chimpanzee abundance has partly driven the species perceived 66 
importance and that Pan-Homo closeness is a poor measure of importance. We then present and 67 
evaluate four arguments that are typically used to justify the selection of Pan in genetics, social 68 
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cognition, ecology and vocal behaviour for the study of human behavioural evolution and more 69 
specifically, language. For each of these arguments, firstly, we show that a Pan-only model to 70 
human and language evolution fails to faithfully depict the putative ancestral hominid behavioural 71 
richness and variability, an image that will inherently be best inferred from analyses that span across 72 
all great ape genera. Doing so, we echo other voices [15,16] who have sought to amend some 73 
misunderstandings in human and language evolution theory and research, such as the belief that 74 
humans evolved from chimpanzees [17] and that our ancestors were chimp-like apes [18]. Secondly, 75 
we show that replacing Pan with any other great ape species or genus as the reference model is 76 
equally ill-advised. Acknowledging the diversity and variance of great ape traits (and more generally 77 
across animal taxa) that contributed to shape cognitive and linguistic evolution will help make new 78 
strides in the effort of reconstructing the evolutionary timeline of language.  79 
 80 
2. Two current biases in the field 81 
2.1. A species over-representation may distort its actual scientific importance 82 
It is hard to design and implement animal research without assessing its practical aspects, and 83 
when it comes to species selection, availability often determines scientists’ choices. Certain species 84 
are chosen not because of their importance but because they are readily available (e.g. fruit flies, 85 
mice, pigeons). However, this seemingly innocent practical consideration has created an 86 
abundance-importance loop that has created a bias in great ape research and stifled research 87 
progress. Abundance (either in the wild or captivity) translates into availability for research, which 88 
in turn translates into larger volumes of research. Larger research volume on a given species, in 89 
turn, drives the species’ theoretical and empirical importance as its biology and behaviour becomes 90 
increasingly better understood. Finally, importance positively feeds back into availability and 91 
research volume, thus closing the loop. Species’ importance stops being inherent to a species, but 92 
in practice a mere after-effect of its own research. 93 
During the 19th and 20th century, this problem was aggravated as animal collections were 94 
being actively established by capturing animals from the wild. In consequence, the perceived 95 
importance of that period for a certain species also drove its capture in the wild, increasing 96 
consequently availability (and thus, research output), ultimately self-fulfilling the premise of the 97 
species’ importance. An example is the case of the capture of 130 hamadryas baboons, housed 98 
during the 1930s at the London Zoo, which caused a flood of studies that eventually became 99 
influential in fuelling the baboon-based single-species model of the 60s [2]. Given serious ethical 100 
and conservation concerns nowadays [19], wild capture by accredited zoological institutions is now 101 
a virtually extinct practice. This has disrupted the chicken-and-egg issue of abundance driving 102 
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importance driving abundance. However, it has also generated a limitation that modern scientists 103 
must work with, particularly in captivity.  The existing zoological collections are a legacy of the 104 
scientific values (and perceived importance) of the 19th and 20th century that have been passed on 105 
to modern primatology, evolutionary anthropology and comparative psychology. They do not 106 
reflect current values or knowledge. Abundance in the wild has also shaped research and species 107 
importance in similar, though less circular, ways. 108 
Today, chimpanzees show the highest abundance among all great apes. In captivity, they 109 
comprise the largest collections, and in the wild their wide-spread range covers virtually the full 110 
length of the African East-West continental axis. One could perhaps justify the current abundance-111 
importance match for chimpanzees by invoking their phylogenetic closeness to humans (see 112 
below). They are, after all, our closest living primate relatives. Should we therefore be so concerned 113 
about the criteria that define a species importance? Though abundance can justify importance, it 114 
is not a criterion for it. Otherwise, bonobos – chimpanzees’ sister species – would be equally 115 
represented in the literature, yet, they remain largely understudied. There have been clear efforts 116 
to correct this discrepancy in research effort within Pan [9]. Some of these attempts have, however, 117 
“simply” removed chimpanzees and set bonobos in their place within the Pan-centric framework, 118 
preserving indirectly a single-species approach for the study of human behavioural evolution. 119 
Neither option is suitable because an excessive reliance on phylogenetic closeness to humans can 120 
still be problematic, as we discuss next.         121 
 122 
2.2. Phylogeny is a misleading indicator of a species scientific importance 123 
The fact that the surviving hominid lineages today are Homo, Pan, Gorilla and Pongo is a historic 124 
artefact. Some say an accident [20]. If we played the tape of life again (paraphrasing S.J. Gould), 125 
other fossils would likely be known, other lineages would be likely alive and/or the same lineages 126 
would likely show a suite of different traits, as slight differences would have compounded 127 
differently over evolutionary time (Fig. 1).  128 
It is important, therefore, to bear in mind that Pan and Homo have been assigned a separate 129 
taxon (Homininae) because Pan happens to be our closest-related hominids alive today. If 130 
hypothetically speaking, some ape lineage that had diverged more recently from the human lineage 131 
than Pan were still alive (Fig. 1), it would probably be classified as Homininae and, furthermore, it 132 
would displace chimpanzees and bonobos from it. We believe that, even if chimpanzees and 133 
bonobos turned out not being our closest living relatives, their dismissal as useful models of human 134 
and language evolution would be unjustified. In another possible evolutionary scenario, if Pan had 135 
become extinct in a distant past, one would be justified to choose Gorilla as the new model for 136 
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human and language evolution (Fig. 1). However, given the various differences between Gorilla 137 
and Pan, this would result in very different hypotheses for human and language evolution. Even 138 
within our current evolutionary universe (i.e. Homo, Pan, Gorilla and Pongo) (Fig. 1), some 139 
researchers have described how present day great ape distribution in the wild, and a fragmentary 140 
fossil record, can contribute to the misrepresentation of the natural history of these lineages, their 141 
origins, dispersions and relationships within Eurasia over the last 10 to 15 mya [21].   142 
These and other limitations that come to light through our knowledge of the workings of 143 
evolution must be recognized. The consequence is that one cannot easily justify electing Pan as a 144 
privileged model to gain insight into human evolution in detriment of other living great apes. Pan 145 
is a privileged comparative model and so are the other last surviving great apes. While work on 146 
Pan is valuable, it is time we embrace the full diversity across great apes (and beyond) to draw as 147 
much information as possible to re-build the lost continuity between ourselves and our last pre-148 
linguistic ancestor.  149 
In the next section, we address the main arguments typically used to justify Pan’s 150 
importance and closeness for the study of human cognitive and behavioural evolution. We don’t 151 
dismiss the importance of these arguments unreservedly but evaluate each of them critically as 152 
criteria for the choice of a model species in the study of language evolution. We start with genetics, 153 
the golden standard for gauging phylogenetic closeness to humans among great apes.   154 
 155 
3. Why Pan-favouritism is unwarranted in the study of language evolution 156 
3.1. Genetic similarity does not automatically translate into similarity of language-like traits 157 
Members of Pan represent the last extant lineage to have diverged from the human clade. Hence, 158 
they exhibit the highest levels of genetic similarity with humans among all great apes and this has 159 
been a primary motivator for a Pan-centric approach to language evolution. Although Pan-Homo 160 
genetic relatedness in comparison to Gorilla-Homo or Pongo-Homo is undisputable, it is also 161 
misleading. Notably, because it is a measure of overall genetic similitude. It is not a measure of the 162 
genetic similitude between genome sections that have known implications for the development of 163 
behavioural and/or cognitive mechanisms, including those underpinning language. Analyses of 164 
hominid genome regions known to encode structures and functions involved in communicative 165 
behaviour and cognition, such as the FOXP2 great ape orthologs, for example [22], render a much 166 
subtler picture than that sketched by overall genetic relatedness or bare cladistics. Humans with 167 
altered versions of the FOXP2 gene show, besides severe speech and language impartment, 168 
changes in the structure and activation of the cortex, basal ganglia and cerebellum [23]. Expression 169 
of the gene is also involved in heart and lung tissues, for example, but its role is specifically 170 
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associated with the neurological development of circuitry responsible for motor coordination and 171 
vocal production [23].  172 
Humans have a unique FOXP2 structure, which differs from that of chimpanzees, gorillas 173 
and rhesus macaques, namely, two nonsynonymous amino-acid substitutions have been fixed in 174 
the human version of the gene. Because there have been no fixed substitutions between 175 
chimpanzees, gorillas and rhesus macaques, their gene structure represents the putative primate 176 
ancestral state. There is, however, a catch. Orangutans have accumulated a unique fixed 177 
nonsynonymous amino-acid substitution [24]. This substitution is not similar to any of the two 178 
human substitutions. This mismatch may perhaps justify its dismissal but a deeper look reveals 179 
otherwise. Mutated versions of the human gene with only one substitution (instead of two) cause 180 
grave speech and language impairments, demonstrating that the evolution of the gene in the 181 
human clade was not simply a two-step up from its primate ancestral form. This means instead 182 
that intermediate stages in gene structure likely involved one or more substitutions at different loci in 183 
the gene until the present human structure came about. The existence of an orangutan substitution 184 
at a different locus seems, thus, to be evolutionarily more pertinent than, thus far, recognized. 185 
Indeed, whilst described in the original paper [24], subsequent reviews on the matter seem to omit 186 
any mention of it and fail to consider altogether the true implications of orangutan’s version of 187 
the gene [23].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  188 
Indeed, recent detailed analyses have confirmed that this unique amino-acid substitution 189 
in Pongo encompasses structural and functional changes in the orangutan biochemical phenotype 190 
[22]. This demonstrates that this substitution has structural consequences in individuals’ phenotype 191 
and that their biological makeup would be different without this substitution in terms of the 192 
circuitry involved in motor skills and vocal articulation and control. While the strand of research 193 
on great ape FOXP2 orthologs is still in its infancy, these phenotypical effects seems to be 194 
potentially linked and help explain some of the remarkable language-like and sophisticated vocal 195 
learning and vocal invention capacities described in Pongo [25–28]. If measured by the number of 196 
FOXP2 amino-acid substitutions since the last great ape common ancestor, only orangutans and 197 
humans have accumulated functional substitutions. 198 
One could feel perhaps tempted to turn to Pongo as the new single-species model for 199 
language evolution. However, other types of genetic alterations within FOXP2 that occur across 200 
all great apes indicate that any single-species model is unsuitable. For example, it is now established 201 
that microsatellite variation and nonsynonymous polymorphisms occur across orangutans, gorillas 202 
and chimpanzees in non-negligible frequencies [22]. Such variation only partially overlaps between 203 
great apes and could tie back to cases of voluntary breathing control [29] and variation in vocal 204 
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repertoire composition in gorillas [30] or described events of vocal learning [31–36], intentional vocal 205 
signalling [37–41] and concurrent activations and architectural changes in Broca’s homolog brain 206 
region in chimpanzees [42–44]. Choosing Pan, Gorilla or Pongo as a basis for a single-species model 207 
would deprive the theory of human and language evolution of relevant information: namely the 208 
contribution that each great ape species can make to the larger picture, made up of different, but 209 
interlocking pieces of data.  210 
 211 
3.2. No great ape is cognitively "greater" than the other 212 
Language is fundamentally a cultural system that requires specific cognitive processes to be in 213 
place. Does Pan cognition show considerable differences with regard to the other great apes that 214 
could bear on the evolution of language-like cultural systems? The answer seems to be negative. 215 
All great ape species exhibit cognitive mechanisms of social learning and transmission that allow 216 
for the emergence of new innovations and their diffusion through populations, which 217 
subsequently become local traditions [30,45,46]. The gamut of traditions exhibited by any particular 218 
population varies across great ape genera, defining each population’s specific and unique cultural 219 
repertoire [45].  220 
In captivity, where socio-ecological conditions are often virtually equal across great ape 221 
genera, Pan does not consistently outperform other great ape genera in social cognition measured 222 
either as single tasks [47–49], or as part of a multi-item test battery [50]. Even after including tasks 223 
measuring non-social domains, many studies still show no clear-cut differences between genera [51–224 
55], and when differences exist [50,56,57], it is not always the case that Pan consistently outperforms 225 
the other great ape genera. For instance, chimpanzees outperform orangutans in object 226 
permanence and causality tasks [50] but the reverse seems to be true in some problem-solving tasks 227 
[56–58]. There is, therefore, no compelling evidence that any of the great ape species consistently 228 
outclasses all the others in every domain. In fact, one of the few results that does seem consistent 229 
and generalizable across studies is that individual variation within species is vast and in some cases 230 
as large between individuals of the same species as individuals of different species. At the same 231 
time, different great ape species can be more similar to each other in captivity than captive and 232 
wild counterparts of the same species (for example, with regard to terrestriality and tool use, [59]).  233 
 234 
3.3. Lessons learned about the ecology of language evolution from each great ape species 235 
Hominid evolution was affected by the uplift of the East African Plateau [60], which disrupted 236 
climatic cycles and caused pulse events of high climate variability and long-term increase of dry 237 
and arid ecosystems [61]. These processes have presumably driven hominid diversification, 238 
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including speciation events along the human clade, and thus, to have driven directly or indirectly 239 
the emergence of language. It could be argued that within Pan, savannah chimpanzees provide 240 
unique models since they live today in some of the most arid habitats inhabited by any living great 241 
ape [62–64]. While true and revealing, a Pan-centric approach to language evolution based on ecology 242 
will nonetheless defect in how much information it can generate about the ecology of human and 243 
language evolution.  For example, Bornean orangutans (P. pygmaeus), while inhabiting rain forests, 244 
experience some of the most extreme events of food variability between mast years, so much so 245 
that they enter in ketosis and endure periods of negative protein balance during the most severe 246 
and meagre seasons [65]. Differences in habitat between eastern and western Gorillas (G. beringei 247 
and G. gorilla), covering some of the highest ranges of elevations and altitudes within any great ape 248 
genus, can potentially provide likewise a uniquely informative scenario for divergence events of 249 
hominid biology and communication driven by climate, particularly in light of the far-reaching 250 
continent-wide range of human ancestors and archaic humans [66]. The same applies for Bornean 251 
orangutans experiencing food scarcity and their counterparts inhabiting the fertile peat-swamps of 252 
the West coast of Sumatra [67], or between savannah and forest-dwelling chimpanzees.  253 
 Besides providing the physical stage for communication, habitat type is also a direct 254 
determinant of a species’ diet. Indeed, new evidence from phylogenetic analyses [68] and 255 
mathematical modelling [69] indicates that ecological (other than social) challenges were a primary 256 
driver for brain expansion within the human clade. Understanding the direct (e.g. habitat acoustics) 257 
and indirect (e.g. productivity, diet, energetics) ecological challenges that the hominid family 258 
experienced during and after the Miocene, including the direct ancestors of Homo, and the 259 
adaptation of their communication and signal systems, will advance faster if we begin to draw 260 
comparisons within and between extant great ape genera.  261 
 262 
3.4. Living links between great ape vocal skills and human verbal skills 263 
Speech is the only universal medium of language. That is, each and every human population 264 
exhibits, at least, one spoken language. Spoken language is also the basis for virtually all major 265 
writing systems, wherein symbols encode sound (typically of phonemes or syllables). For these 266 
reasons, the vocal capacities of great apes have historically been a key component in the study of 267 
possible precursors and processes for language evolution within the human clade [70–72]. Originally, 268 
during the 1960s, one of the predominant hypotheses was that speech, as the primary means 269 
expression of language, was hampered in nonhuman species due to anatomical constraints that 270 
imposed crucial limitations for speech production [73,74]. Today, however, various strands of data 271 
suggest that, even though the evolution of speech has left a mark in human anatomy [75], primate 272 
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vocal anatomy does not represent a serious impairment for speech-like production. Different 273 
anatomies would have generated slightly different vocal output but speech-like expression would 274 
have been possible nevertheless [76–80]. These data compelled some scholars decades later to 275 
assume that great apes could not speak because they “didn’t have the brains”, or in other words, 276 
that neural anatomy (instead of vocal anatomy) prevented speech production (reviewed in [27]).  A 277 
renewed interest in great ape vocal capacities over the last few years is generating a growing body 278 
of evidence that is disproving this idea [27]. New evidence includes and is not limited to, for 279 
example, the capacity for vocal invention [81], vocal learning [32,33,82], production of consonant- and 280 
vowel-like calls [28,83,84], learned vocal production at speech-like rhythm [80], complex (non-281 
Markovian) vocal sequences [85], call traditions and cultures [30,86,87], vocal tools and manipulations 282 
for the generation of rare acoustic phenomena [88,89], intentional vocalizations [37,39,40], deceptive 283 
vocal responses [88], and time-space vocal displacement [26]. Findings for advanced vocal skills in 284 
great apes are supported by convergent inter-disciplinary lines of evidence, from great ape 285 
genomics [22,90] to great ape neurology and neurophysiology [91], indicating that “[t]he  inter-286 
mediate vocal  phenotype of non-human great apes [between Old-World monkeys and humans] 287 
suggests that selection for increased vocal-motor control had already begun at the time of the last 288 
common ancestor of the great ape lineage” [91].  289 
Moreover, recent research shows that within Pan, chimpanzees and bonobos have 290 
experienced arguably some of the most accelerated divergence in vocal anatomy among great apes, 291 
even though they represent sister species [92,93]. This shows that opting for a Pan-centric approach 292 
ignores the rich and informative differences both within that genus and the evolutionary paths 293 
taken by each great ape species, each unique and potentially revealing in its own way. Findings 294 
regarding gestural communication in great apes, including inter-species comparisons, evoke a 295 
similar general interpretation [94–96]. 296 
Altogether, the burgeoning strand of great ape vocal research [27,91,97] shows that traditional 297 
ideas about what great apes can and (mostly) cannot do are outdated, too crude or unsubstantiated. 298 
The precursor system for (spoken) language evolution will be best understood when zooming out 299 
our theoretical and empirical lenses to include the vocal (and gestural) behaviour of all great ape 300 
genera, including its neural and molecular substrates.   301 
 302 
4. Concluding remarks and future perspectives 303 
Notwithstanding the closer overall genetic and taxonomic proximity of Pan with humans, 304 
comparative research across great apes in the fields of genetics, cognition, ecology, and vocal 305 
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behaviour does not elect Pan as being a more preferred or better suited model for the study of 306 
language evolution. This ought also to apply to the evolutionary study of other aspects of human 307 
cognition and communication. As explored and reviewed here across fields, single-species models 308 
will inevitably result in fragmentary data and piecemeal accounts of the evolutionary history of 309 
language or any of its particular traits, whatever the chosen model species may be. Therefore, our 310 
intention here is not to transform a (Pan-centric) single-species paradigm into another single 311 
species, genus or family-based paradigm. Much remains to be learned from an ever-wider 312 
taxonomic approach to language evolution. Data from many species can contribute to our 313 
understanding of this unrepeated phenomenon that has only occurred in our lineage during the 314 
period of about 3.5 billion years of life on Earth.  315 
Language evolution is perhaps one of the most fabulous puzzles to have tantalized 316 
philosophers, scholars, naturalists, and scientists throughout the centuries. To stand a chance of 317 
understanding its evolution, we need to consider non-exclusively all the lines of evidence 318 
potentially available – lines that ought to extent as far down in the tree of life (thus, include as 319 
many species) as possible. Fully acknowledging the diversity in great ape cognition and 320 
communication is an important and necessary step in this direction. As our closest relatives, they 321 
complement in a unique way what can only be gleaned from the fossil record. Great apes represent 322 
an empirical gem of sorts and we must cherish their present, importance and current diversity, 323 
before it is too late [19,98]. Each and every great ape, individual and species, will provide unique lost 324 
fragments about our own past and history, including about the timeline of the feature that best 325 
characterises us – language.    326 
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Figure 1. The great evolutionary roulette and our understanding of human evolution. The 337 
evolutionary roulette has innumerable possible outcomes, one of which is our current universe 338 
(green shades indicate extant lineages), where the closest living relatives to humans (within black 339 
squares) today are member of Pan. Different evolutionary outcomes would generate, however, 340 
alter-universes (1 and 2) where other lineages closer related to humans would be alive or extinct 341 
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